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ABSTRACT
In this paper it is argued that Barad’s Agential Realism, an approach to quantum mechanics 
originating in the philosophy of Niels Bohr, can be the basis of a ‘theory of everything’ 
consistent with a proposal of Wheeler that ‘observer-participancy is the foundation of 
everything’.  On the one hand, agential realism can be grounded in models of self-
organisation such as the hypercycles of Eigen, while on the other agential realism, by virtue 
of the ‘discursive practices’ that constitute one aspect of the theory, implies the possibility of 
the generation of physical phenomena through acts of specification originating at a more 
fundamental level.  This kind of order stems from the  association of persisting structures with
special mechanisms for sustaining such structures.  Included in phenomena that may be 
generated by these mechanisms are the origin and evolution of life, and human capacities 
such as mathematical and musical intuition.
INTRODUCTION
The quest for a ‘theory of everything’ may be said to have begun with Newtonian mechanics, 
followed by Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, then basic quantum mechanics, later quantum 
electrodynamics, then ultimately the ‘Standard Model’, which provides a unified description 
of the strong, weak and electromagnetic forces, and fits the experimental data well.  But the 
task of including gravitation in the ‘theory of everything’ has not turned out so well, the 
outcome being theories that are mathematically elegant, but where there is little or no contact 
with experiment.  Other questions also arise in connection with the idea of a theory of 
everything, such as whether quantum mechanics as such is applicable to biology (1), and 
whether or not it provides an adequate account of observation.
The difficulties cited above may be of little interest to the working physicist, but they could 
have a similar status to that of the ‘small clouds on the horizon’ that beset classical physics at 
one time, ultimately leading to it being superseded by quantum theory.  Those difficulties 
accordingly merit closer attention.  The approach that seems most promising in this context is 
the realist point of view characterising the ‘agential realism’ of Karen Barad (2), and the 
‘reality of possibility’ concept of Ruth Kastner (3).  The realist position differs from the usual 
one adopted in quantum mechanics in that it attempts to describe what actually happens in the
case of individual events, rather than simply computing averages.  The difference is apparent 
in the case of a typical high-energy physics experiment in which large numbers of individual 
events are observed.  Quantum theory addresses only statistical averages, whereas one can 
imagine instead a theory that can describe what happens individual events.  In confining 
oneself to statistics as is the norm, one may be missing crucial information, as would indeed 
happen in sciences such as astronomy.  This would clearly be the case in astronomy, where for
example a statistical approach to meteor showers would fail to note the occasional peaks in 
intensity.
 The present paper attempts to go beyond the formulations of Barad and Kastner in two ways. 
First of all, a close affinity will be demonstrated between agential realism and certain classical
models of self-organisation, such as Eigen’s hypercycle model, with the conclusion that the 
characteristic features of the quantum domain may merely involve some possibility within the
classical domain, characterised by a particular kind of order.  Quantum mechanics would still 
remain an important area of study, but would no longer be regarded as fundamental, and study
of this specific type of order would then replace particle physics as currently practiced as the 
premier field of study in physics. Further, in this connection it will be shown how a particular 
aspect of agentive realism, namely the evolution of discursive practices, can account for the 
emergence of specific physical phenomena, in rather the same way that discourse within a 
technical community leads to technical advances on the human plane.   Such a picture would 
explain physical reality in a way totally different from the conventional one where some 
specific calculation would account for the details of phenomena.
INDETERMINACY
Barad’s agential realism, an attempt to make sense of the quantum domain in realist terms, is 
a development of ideas due to Niels Bohr, where a central role is played by the concept of 
indeterminacy.  Bohr argued that details of the quantum domain are in general not merely 
uncertain, relating to mere ignorance of the details, but indefinite or indeterminate, in the 
sense that treating values of variables as definite would be contradictory.  For example, when 
a beam of light is split into two by a beam splitter and combined in such a way as to produce 
an observable interference pattern, we may be inclined, considering photons as particles, to 
ask which path was taken by an individual detected photon.  But if a one of the two paths had 
definitely been taken by a photon, there would be no interference pattern.  This contradiction 
implies that the question of which path a particular photon took has no acceptable answer.  
Bohr infers from this that one should not presume that a given assertion about a system is 
necessarily meaningful; rather, what can be stated meaningfully is a function of the context.  
Quantum particles are not like classical particles, where attributes can be presumed regardless
of the context.
AGENTIAL REALISM
Barad considers it a defect of Bohr’s philosophy as stated above that he gives too much 
priority to the situation of the physics experiment, thereby introducing an artificial distinction 
between experiments and the rest of nature.  Furthermore, he ignores the question of what is 
the case (ontology), considering only what can be known (epistemology). To address these 
deficiencies, Barad argues that what is real is the phenomenon, for example an action of 
measurement.   An aspect of such a phenomenon is the agential cut, referring to a separation 
following measurement between a measuring apparatus registering the outcome of a 
measurement (an agent), and something playing the role of an object of measurement.  This 
split is something that can happen in the context of a measurement, but the process described 
is hypothesised to be a more general possibility, producing in effect a subject-object split.
Furthermore, as noted by Bohr, we would be wrong to treat measurement as being a 
measurement of some abstract entity such as position; rather the physical apparatus related to 
the abstraction is primary, and only as a limiting case does the measurement that the apparatus
delivers correspond exactly to a concept that we may have such as position or momentum.  In 
the case of scientific measurements, the design of the measuring instrument is guided the 
intent to measure some existing parameter, but this need not be the case in general; rather, a 
concept associated with an agent emerges over time as the agent evolves.
We can, if we wish, view the situation in the following terms.  A quantum particle is not like a
classical particle, but more like a swarm of insects or birds, where while we can be definite 
that the entity exists, ascribing to the entity concerned it a definite position or velocity is not 
permissible.  Further, there can at times be a phenomenon analogous to a cut, involving the 
appearance of a further distinguishable entity, or in general a structure of some kind.
Structures that emerge in this way, are structures within the total phenomenon and contingent 
upon it, and cannot be viewed in isolation just as, in the same way, quasi-particles in a 
medium, and their interactions, are features of that medium and cannot be understood in 
isolation.  Dependence on the background applies equally to relationships between structures.
THE PRIORITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
According to Barad, relationships precede relata: relationships are prior to things that are 
related.  This may seem mysterious at first sight, but becomes less so if we recognise that 
relationships depend on specific schema.  Just as entities emerge under which entities tend to 
sustain themselves, there are contexts in which particular schemes of interaction assist entities
in sustaining themselves.  One might characterise this state of affairs by saying that in them 
the advantages of particular design principles are being manifested.
DISCURSIVE PRACTICE
The analysis can now be taken one step further, taking into account the fact that the activity of
one structure may systematically influence others.  This introduces the idea of a distinction 
between information and the influence of that information.  Such a distinction involves a kind 
of symmetry breaking, where one entity starts to exert control over others, so it becomes a 
supplier of information to other systems.  A further subtlety is Barad’s concept of discursive 
practice.  For information transfer to be able to be effective at achieving some outcome, 
information must be processed in accord with enduring specific rules, and it is the behaviour 
associated with the application of such rules that Barad terms discursive practice.
We now consider discursive practice and its evolution in more detail.  For communication 
between two entities to be effective, they must share a language or discursive system, an 
integrated entity that may involve and evolve many components, some of which involve 
discursive activity itself, whilst others relate this discursive activity to the context of its use, in
other words to non-discursive practices.  Discursive activity is a form of measurement 
process, with discourse relating to what control may be possible.  Thus evolution of discursive
practice is related to the emergence of new mechanisms for control.
Discursive practices are closely linked with concepts.  Earlier we noted Bohr’s comment that 
while position, for example, appears to be a well-defined concept, a word such as position has
meaning only to the extent that we are able to say what the position of something is with 
some appropriate apparatus.  The same applies to relationships, which are similarly entities 
that can be characterised with suitable apparatus or perceptual equipment.  Discourse adds 
precision to this state of affairs, as for example by the way it permits the formulation of rules 
and to define relationships and processes.  In the case of human society, discursive practices 
have reached a very high level of development, and our discussion of the emergence of 
physical laws will invoke the possibility of similar evolutionary development in the quantum 
domain.
THE ACTIVE ASPECT OF MATTER
Barad views matter as something active, configuring its surroundings so as to continue to 
function effectively (‘concerning itself with what matters’).  Activity as such is by no means 
an unorthodox presumption, since omnipresent activity is familiar both in classical physics, in
the context of molecular motion at finite temperatures, and in the case of quantum-mechanical
zero-point motion.  And in the biological context, matter configuring its surroundings 
appropriately is equally familiar.  What is new here is simply the idea that the quantum 
domain involves similar configuration processes.
Eigen’s discussions of biological self-organisation (4) are relevant in this context.  The 
question he addresses is how the complicated molecular systems found in biology can sustain 
themselves and also evolve.  He concludes that a structure known as a hypercycle plays a 
crucial role, being able for example to utilise small selective advantages and to be able to 
evolve quickly on the basis of the selective advantages that favour self-sustaining systems..  
Hypercycles, involving a closed cycle of information carriers coding for functional systems 
that generate the information carrier next in the cycle, can also develop branches exhibiting 
various functionalities, with a common element allowing the branches to coexist.  Computer 
simulations have demonstrated the validity of such conclusions.
Eigen’s models involve molecules, but the principles involved could be equally relevant in the
context of agential realism, provided that structures with corresponding features exist.  There 
seem to be no fundamental reasons why this should not be the case, especially in a system 
close to an instability, where non-linearity would be conducive to structure formation.
Hankey (5) has arrived at conclusions somewhat similar to those of Eigen, along the 
following lines. A system that performs a sequence of changes can develop an instability if 
some end product is similar to the starting situation, thereby allowing the cycle to be repeated.
The existence of such cycles can be probed by a general increase in the effective gain, and 
when such cycles emerge changes can be made to enhance the extent to which they are self-
sustaining.  Such self-sustaining cycles are then readily available for use in other situations.  
Learning in general is known to involve similar cyclic processes (i.e. the repetition that 
typically forms an integral part of the learning process).
THE SELF-MAINTENANCE PRINCIPLE
Implicit in the above discussion is the principle of self-maintenance, namely that what is 
present in a situation is in part determined by what can maintain itself.  From this it can be 
anticipated that entities exhibiting effective principles of self-maintenance will also be found, 
and that these principles may well involve the way such entities interact with other entities.  
This proposition is, clearly, relevant to biology, and the principles of agential realism can 
equally be viewed in this light.  For example, the agential cut can be seen as a strategy where 
differentiation into subsystems has a value in that two cooperating systems, relating to each 
other and developing in accord with particular schemes, may be able to achieve more than can
a single system.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE POSSIBILIST INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM 
MECHANICS
In Kastner’s ‘possibilist interpretation’ of quantum mechanics (3), the collapse of the wave 
function associated with observation is interpreted as the outcome of a transaction with a 
possibility, which outcome makes something definite, in the same way as in the present 
analysis.  Possibilities are things that can be considered real, but are not necessarily 
actualised, which state of affairs Kastner equates with existing ‘within the observable 
spacetime theater’.  The theory developed here can accommodate possibilities but in a 
different way, namely as aspects of discourse rather than something real.  In this way, 
Kastner’s transactions with possibilities translate into discourse involving possibilities, of 
which some may subsequently be realised.
 
EVOLUTIONARY AGENTIAL REALISM
John Archibald Wheeler, in his article ‘Law without Law’ (6), explored the hypothesis that the
‘observer-participancy’ of quantum mechanics (equivalent to the measurement process 
discussed in the above) could be the basis of a new science that could replace the existing 
‘imposing structure of science’.  The above considerations leave us in a position to understand
how this might be achieved.  The new picture involves agents evolving more and more 
advanced concepts over time, instantiated by evolving discursive practices along the same 
lines as those involved with cultural evolution.  The basic mechanics of evolution would be 
the same, only the context in which that evolution would take place being different.  With 
cultural evolution, we start with regular physics and chemistry, and with nervous systems 
already preprogrammed with mechanisms for developing along particular lines.  Here we start
with a system that knows essentially nothing, but which can explore and learn, provided the 
initial physics supports the kinds of structures and relationships that are required.
As to details, what we know about how children come to make sense of the world is arguably 
relevant, since they also start knowing almost nothing. Piaget (7) made systematic studies of 
the incremental changes that occur during development, each of which can be identified with 
the coming into operation, and utilisation, of a new module.  An example is the development 
of the object concept: at a certain stage in a child’s development an object that is covered up 
so it is no longer visible is treated as if it no longer exists: for example it will stop trying to 
reach it if it had been trying to reach it previously, but later new resources become available 
and actions directed towards the object continue even when it cannot be seen.  There is a clear
logic to the sequence of the incremental changes (8), as a consequence of the way existing 
skills need to be operational before new ones can be acquired.  The computer model of 
Osborne (9) exemplifies such an incremental process.
As regards the actual mechanics, what has been discussed so far suggests the following 
picture.  From an initial hypercycle the developments envisaged by Eigen and Hankey can 
occur, with new concepts being established through the mechanisms envisaged by Bohr and 
Barad, whereby some apparatus becomes more and more representative of particular concepts
over time.  The fact that this process involves the use of the mechanisms corresponding to a 
concept implies in effect that it is the most useful concepts that get developed in this way.  
Familiar examples in childhood development are those of an object, and number, which get 
clearly defined though apparatus that deals with reality in such terms.
As regards space, we recall that geometry developed originally through the study of 
manipulations involving actual movements in space, and we can imagine the agents of 
agential realism acquiring spatial concepts in the same way.  Barad considers space not as ‘a 
collection of preexisting points set out in a fixed geometry, a container … for matter to 
inhabit’, but rather as the concomitant of a collection of interactions within a system (referred 
to by her as intra-actions), referred to as a topology.  How this topological structure is related 
to ordinary geometry is not discussed, but given the relevance that symmetry groups have in 
geometry, one possibility would be that concepts of transformation and invariance play a role,
in conjunction with group properties defined in terms of transformations, which together can 
serve to delineate a geometry.  Our subtle agents are presumed to be able to work on the basis 
of such concepts to shape a geometry to fit particular specifications.  Barad notes that 
relationships develop prior to space, justifying the possibility of relationships existing 
irrespective of spatial relationships, as happens with the EPR paradox.
Ultimately, discourse evolving in the manner described can come to cover techniques for 
creating particular kinds of universe, and particular kinds of life in such universes.  Such 
partly directed behaviour could have relevance to questions such as the origin and evolution 
of life where, perhaps as a consequence of the influence of Monod’s writings (10), it has 
traditionally been assumed that there is no preferred direction or meaning in the universe.
LINKS TO HUMAN CAPACITIES
This picture may in addition be able to account for human skills such as mathematical and 
musical intuition, which are hard to explain on conventional grounds there being little to 
account for the selectivity of aesthetic judgements in music (11), or similar ability to discern 
mathematical truth, on evolutionary grounds. These may reflect functional mechanisms at a 
deeper level, to which human mentality has access.
CONCLUSIONS
The conventional picture is that cognitive processes derive from biology, which itself derives 
from physics and chemistry, which again derive from some deeper physics such as string 
theory that has minimal contact with experiment.  Quantum mechanics is assumed rather than 
derived.  In the present approach the idea of a self-sustaining system is primary, manifesting 
itself in universal basic forms that can combine together in complex ways.  Specific principles
related to systems being self-sustaining then come into play, including differentiation into 
units, and protocols relevant to relationships between units.  These include the use of 
discourse, with its ability relate to reality in ways that can readily generalise.  Physical laws 
then emerge as concomitants to prescriptive discourse, in the manner discussed above.
There are some parallels between the present situation and that which prevailed at the time 
when the atomic theory was being developed.  The latter postulated a deeper reality capable 
of accounting in simple terms for a number of phenomena (such as the specific heat and 
thermal conductivity of gases) that were, at that time, characterised in purely mathematical 
terms with no underlying model.  Taking the hypothesised deeper reality seriously led to 
considerable advances in science, and the same may apply to the present proposals.  While 
this the view presented here is very different to the usual one, there is nothing irrational about 
it; it merely contradicts ideas that are commonly held, which ideas would be irrational 
themselves if held as dogma.  Clearly, the synthesis described here is far from complete, and 
it must be for the future to examine the proposals in detail to assess their relevance and 
validity. 
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